As you may have noticed, I posted my backlog of Japan-trip related entries, backdating it all to april 30, day of my returning to France, so that you may inspect in my April 2004 archives all of my entries related to this trip to Japan (and other entries from that month, too).
So these halfwits say that rational people ought to be bayesian. Sure. But bayesian about just what? By imposing not the right a priori probability distribution (that will eventually be fixed by experience) but the right descriptional paradigm, the right "meta-context", memetic parasites can have even "bayesian" people believe a lot of nonsense; just propose as "independent" facts on which to be bayesians things that are not so independent after all -- by bombarding readers with systematically biased data to evaluate, you will easily tip their opinions toward the direction of your choice; and they don't even have to choose "right" rather than "wrong" -- they only have to accept your problematics, your choice of data to evaluate. That's where Solomonoff induction comes into play.( Collapse )