Cybernethics / Cybernéthique

I am always amazed when people fail to distinguish between constants and variables. I am all the more amazed when the victims of such confusion are the otherwise brilliant implementers of programming languages. You'd think that if anyone knows the difference between a variable and a constant, it would be a programming language implementer.

In his book Discover Your Inner Economist, Tyler Cowen notably explains why one should not give to beggars, by using an argument called rent exhaustion. I explained earlier why undiscriminating charity was indeed only fostering parasitism and vice (though I admit I've been so weak as to subsidize my local liquor store that way a few times since I wrote said article). My argument used the Law of Bitur-Camember, which indeed seems to be essentially equivalent to the argument of rent exhaustion as systematized and applied to any political rent. Unhappily, even amongst Economist (as opposed to mere econometrists), too many will not or dare not explicitly apply economic arguments to Politics itself. Tyler himself, though he doesn't seem to indulge too much in the fallacy of considering the State as above society, won't seem to openly come against it.

Great progress will be made when people cease to implicitly accept the Statist Myth of the State as some entity above society, beyond the laws of human behavior, capable of regulating from outside and violate, counter or alter the laws of human behavior to engineer people's lives according to whichever fantasies of the rulers. Many economists have worked to dispel this myth -- Gordon Tullock and James Buchanan being some of the first to explicitly apply the economic point of view to the systematic study of government. These days, while I like the blogs of many economists at GMU, including Tyler's, Don Boudreaux's blog stands out in its relentless effort to dispel the Statist Myth. But even they seem to do it without systematically conceptualizing it.

Now even many libertarians make the mistake of discussing various policies as if there really was a State above Society capable to turn arbitrary policies into new laws of human behavior at no cost. Actually, the policies that the State enacts are arbitrary neither in their causes nor in their consequences. On the one hand, they are the result of human actions that have great cost; on the other hand, they do not alter human nature, but only modify human behavior through violence and threats thereof.

Laws are only enacted but with powerful lobbies and ideologies behind them, that either are allowed to clash in an expensive war of all against all, or are given free reign as one hegemonic party imposes its one-sided will upon all. And the same parties that clash over each of their turfs always agree in their common cause against the public.

Then again, laws only affect those who get caught. It costs in violent law enforcement, enacted by bureaucrats empowered against the designated suspects. It costs in bureaucratic hurdles that people have to comply with to receive their subsidies and privileges.

Finally, the next best alternative that people find to openly acting as is officially prohibited is seldom to embrace the desires and tastes of the oppressor. People will do in private what they can't do in public. They will rather live in the dark rather than pay the tax on windows.

No one can decree a better mankind. Political power is no magic wand that can achieve that. Prohibiting the perceived symptoms of evil only spreads more evil and dulls out perception in a typical instance of the Law of Eristic Escalation.

I agree with all those leftist intellectuals that it's scandalous that some people should make money because they have and can manipulate information that other people don't. And thus, first things first, let's start solving the problem with the worst offenders: the information professionals. I propose that university professors, journalists, authors, talk show hosts, "artists", and other lesson-givers should be mandated by law to never be paid more than a janitor. Of course they will agree, since they are not motivated by money, this evil thing, but by the love of other people (or is it the love of "nature" at the expense of other people?)

Au cours d'un débat, je me suis vu opposé comme souvent l'argument bâteau du pragmatisme contre l'idéologie. Ah, le pragmatisme! Se vanter de son absence de principes comme d'une vertu! Mais comment pouvez-vous savoir si telle ou telle règle est pratique, tandis que telle autre ne l'est pas, si vous n'avez aucun principe pour juger? Pour paraphraser Daniel Dennett, il n'y a pas de science sans principe, mais il y a beaucoup de sciences qui refusent d'examiner leurs principes. Les soi-disant pragmatiques n'agissent pas sans principes: la vérite est bien plutôt qu'ils ont des principes mais que ces principes sont inavoués, le plus souvent parce qu'inavouables.

Mais j'aurai beau prouver que de tels arguties sont absurdes, jamais un pragmatique ne concédera avoir eu tort, n'essaiera d'articuler ses principes jusque là implicites, voire de les réformer explicitement. Car le pragmatisme ne repose pas sur une erreur de raisonnement, pas plus que sur de la mauvaise foi. Il repose sur une absence de raisonnement, sur une foi qui est en-deçà du bon et du mauvais. Il repose sur l'incapacité, la défiance et/ou le refus de l'abstraction, ce qu'Ayn Rand appelle la mentalité anti-conceptuelle, sur la prépondérance de ce que dans la typologie Myers-Briggs on appelle Sensing par opposition à iNtuition: un esprit concret plutôt qu'abstrait.

At a recent talk at BU about Consciousness, Steven Horst, a professor of philosophy at Wesleyan advanced an apparently well-known argument by Frank Jackson. The argument uses the thought experiment of a woman named Mary, kept in a controlled environment of black, white and grey, and at the same time made to know everything that the most advanced future (omni)science of the physical world can possibly tell her about the brain. Now, argues Frank, when she is made to see something red at last, she learns something new that could not be contained in such knowledge. And thus, concludes Horst with Frank, there is something beyond the physical world that is necessary for this experience to happen.

Of course this vulgar mystical argument is based on a typical confusion between object and representation -- the ultimate source of insanity according to Korzybski.

It's never as much fun bashing conservatives as it is bashing socialists (or their mini-me incarnations as social-democrats or liberals as they are called in the USA). Indeed, conservatives are rather openly irrational and anti-rational and have simpler absurdities, whereas socialists hide their irrationality under false claims of rationality, and build intricate network of lies to cover their absurdities. The battle of conservatives against socialists is really the battle of stupidity against evil. The zero against the negative: Whichever side wins, we lose - though admittedly not as much at once. And these two aspects of Statism feed each other.

Nevertheless, it is time for me to tackle the conservative argument, or lack thereof. I'll do my best to do it in the randian tradition of reduction to clarity. If my argument doesn't satisfy you, you can still peruse Hayek's classic Why I am not a Conservative.

As a follow-up to my short post The ideology spread by Stalin's agents, see this very good analysis by ESR, Suicidalism. (Cám ơn, Kae.)

Prenons pour exemple Jean-Jacques Rosa, penseur de la droite nationaliste, qui contrairement à la plupart des commentateurs politiques a eu l'honnêteté intellectuelle de lire des auteurs libéraux avant de critiquer, et qui pourtant ne comprend pas vraiment le libéralisme et commet les mêmes erreurs classiques. Ainsi, dans ce texte sur Frédéric Bastiat, Jean-Jacques Rosa confond deux définitions du mot État, comme organisation de la force d'une part, chose effectivement nécessaire, et comme monopole de la force d'autre part, chose aussi nuisible qu'inutile. Par cette identification, il en vient à déduire que le monopole est nécessaire, que le mal est bien, que le bien est impossible, qu'il faut se résigner à l'État, considérer comme des vandales ceux qui s'y opposent, et rechercher comment mettre cet État au services des Vraies Valeurs. Conclusion absurde s'il en est. Si Bastiat ne distingue pas ces deux concepts par deux mots distincts, comme le fera son ami et successeur Gustave de Molinari, il les distingue bien conceptuellement, dans son essai l'État, par exemple. Rosa a donc tort d'attribuer à Bastiat ce qui est une erreur que Rosa lui-même commet, erreur fondamentale de l'étatisme. Certes, Bastiat ne s'est pas, comme Molinari, penché sur la structure d'un gouvernement sans monopole, et n'est donc pas forcément la référence à donner sur ce propos. Jean-Jacques Rosa a donc fait un effort de recherche, mais n'est pas allé jusqu'au bout de sa démarche de compréhension du libéralisme. A sa décharge, notons que de nombreux libéraux modérés n'ont pas non plus fait cette démarche.

Oui, la responsabilité individuelle est une "fiction". Tandis, que "la société", "l'utilité publiique", "l'intérêt nazional" (socialiiiste), le "paradiis communiste", c'est quelque chose de tout-à-fait concret, de parfaitement défini, et de merveilleusement incarné par notre glorieux État et sa bienveillante Administrazion, -- sous condition toutefois que ce soit mon parti, ma faction, mes opinions, mon autorité, qui y prédomine -- sinon, ce même État est un instrument d'oppression aux mains de l'ÉnemydeklaSS. Bon, il y a malheureusement peu de chance que mon avis personnel soit pris en considérazion -- c'est pourquoi je soutiens pleinement la candidature de X..., chef que je me suis désigné, qui est un homme parfaitement droit et honnête, compétent et intellligent, bon et courageux, et surtout, qui ne possède aucun préjugé (différent des miens) (à ce que je sache) (d'après ce qu'il ressort de sa campagne) (du moins en comparaison de toute autre personne) (si l'on restreint le choix aux candidats engagés) (voire à ceux qui ont une chance de passer) (oops, ça ne fait plus grand monde) (merde alors, il ne reste plus qu'à voter Chirac).

Un mot qui revient souvent en France, le choix de société. Sous-entendu, Je choisis, tu es la société. Car bien sûr le rhéteur s'empresse de donner des conseils sur ce que devrait être ce choix imposé à tous par la force -- le choix s'entend comme terrain pour nos chers êtres supérieurs, cependant que le commun des mortels n'a qu'à opiner. Un choix de société, basé sur l'intérêt général, le bien collectif, la raison d'état, l'économie nationale, j'en passe et des meilleures: voilà les mots clefs de tous les salauds assoiffés de pouvoir de la terre.

One of the first thing that any so-called "macro-economist" does when studying a phenomenon, is to postulate a deterministic model in which there is no choice and all economic costs are thus zero. That is, whenever they introduce mathematical tools, which they do so as to pose as physics-like hard scientists, they begin by negating the very essence of economics: the notion of economic cost. They are actually based upon an epistemology that explicitly denies individuals the essence of their human nature: the ability to make relevant choices. This is true of all economists from all schools of economics, save the few libertarians from the austrian school and its direct relatives. And the crooks include the neo-classical schools (that dictates the economic orthodoxy in most rich countries), and the keynesian and marxist schools (that dictate the economic orthodoxy in France and other socialist countries). No wonder why all these schools of economics produce only lies, in the form of deceitful statistics and bogus assumptions smuggled under the veil of meaningless mathematics.

If mathematical models were to be used at all in economic science, we would need non-deterministic models, replacing (neo)classical economics with quantum economics. And then we'd find that we're not able to even imagine the Feynman diagrams of all possible interactions over which to integrate our economic functions, because the relevant interactions that will take place between agents are precisely those based upon information that others don't have, including the person trying to build the model.

PS: Oh yes, one particular crook from the top of the Establishment just called me ridiculous for rejecting the results of so many scientific studies based on empiricism. You may find more about the fraud that is empiricism in social sciences by reading e.g. Hoppe, whom you may hear in this course.

... is exactly what dominates the Intelligentsia in France and other countries.

You do not endorse Stalin. You do not call yourself a communist. You do not declare your love for the regime. You do not call on people to support the Soviets. Ever. Under any circumstances. You claim to be an independent-minded idealist. You don't understand politics, but you think the little guy is getting a lousy break. You believe in open-mindedness. You are shocked, frightened by what is going on right here in our own country. You are frightened by the racism, by the oppression of the working man. You think that the Russians are trying a great human experiment, and you hope it works. You believe in peace. You yearn for international understanding. You hate fascism. You think the capitalist system is corrupt. You say it over and over again and you say nothing, nothing more.

Double Lives: Spies and Writers in the Secret Soviet War of Ideas against the West by Stephen Koch

Of course, Stalin also had more obvious agents.

In the "public" sector, failing administrations demand more money to do more of the failing things they do. In the "private" sector, successful companies are proposed more money to do more of the successful things they do. Guess which system works better. Of course, if you've read my paper on economic reasoning, you know that the real distinction is not between "public" and "private" but between "based on coercive compulsion" and "based on voluntary cooperation".

Is it possible that Political Power be used in the interest of Liberty? Yes, sometimes it just does happen. Does that imply that on the whole, Political Power is good? Nope. But before you may reply to this kind of question, you have to be familiar with economic reasoning, as opposed to accounting fallacies. Then you will understand that before it may be answered, the question has to be refined: good as compared to what?

In a bus to NYC early in January 2005, I met this gorgeous girl who was reading a course in Economics. The textbook was open on a praise of the Fed and its role in regulating the National Economy, with an opposing page in a special color denoting higher science, that justified this role based on one macroeconomic equation by Keynes. It was too tempting, so I started a conversation.

While in the States, I had an argument with, of all persons, a French man. He argued for relativism, that true and false do not matter, and might not exist at all, that every situation is unique, etc. Yeah sure! His example went that everytime he heard that same Opera was unique. And my reply was that everytime he'd have to listen to the noise of a jackhammer for two uninterrupted hours would be just as unique. He was an extreme example of what Ayn Rand called the anti-conceptual mentality.

Juste parce que j'affirme que Chirac est mieux que Le Pen (ou que Le Pen est moins mauvais que Chirac) ne fait pas de moi un chiraquien (ou un lepéniste). D'ailleurs, je n'ai voté ni l'un ni l'autre. Une préférence, affirmation descriptive, n'est donc pas une action, pas un engagement de ressource. Je n'ai "soutenu" ou "défendu" ni Chirac ni Le Pen. Face à l'alternative proposée, je ne réponds ni oui, ni non, mais Mu. C'est-à-dire que je rejette l'alternative et je refuse de cautionner l'un ou l'autre, comme je suis (heureusement) encore libre de le faire. En fait, je ne cautionne même pas l'élection: je boycotte les urnes par principe.

Et pour rendre la chose plus claire encore: entre Hitler et Staline, si on me forçait à choisir, je choisirais bien l'un des deux. Cela ne fait de moi ni un hitlérien ni un stalinien. Et d'ailleurs, ma préférence marginale pour l'un n'empêche pas que je n'ai rien fait pour soutenir l'un ou l'autre. Mu. Bien au contraire, j'engage ma part de ressources dans la recherche thérapeutique contre le national- et l'international- socialisme. (Si ce cas-là vous paraît trop difficile à trancher, remplacez l'un des deux par un méchant "évidemment" moindre mais toujours néanmoins monstrueux à vos yeux, que ce soit Mussolini, Roosevelt, Napoléon, Barbe Bleue, etc.)

Ceux qui forcent d'autres à choisir sont des criminels. Ceux qui interprètent une préférence comme un engagement sont des imbéciles.

J'aime bien cette cinglante de Tom G. Palmer:

I'm sure that I'll get the usual share of you're objectively pro-war email from the usual crackpots. I'm not. (I'm amazed that so many people assume that if you criticize a bad argument against the war, that makes you pro-war, rather than anti-bad argument and therefore pro-good argument.) But anyway, screw 'em; I've got better things to do than to worry about that sort.

Since several friends did recommend this movie, including David Madore, and despite the gripes of Lew Rockwell, I went to watch I, Robot this weekend with my cousin. As was expected, it is quite far from being an immortal chef d'œuvre, but it's indeed a rather well-realized action flick. However, it is only in the very end, and with a twist, that it turns out to be somewhat faithful to the claimed inspiration from Isaac Asimov, and not at all with the original Robot series. Beware: big spoilers ahead.

Do you prefer X or Y?

Mu. The question is irrelevant to me, because it's not a choice I have or am ever likely to have.

OK, but what if you could make this choice?

How so?

For instance, imagine you had a magic wand that you could wave either way, to achieve either X or Y?

You mean a device possessing a great power capable of achieving either X or Y?

Il faudra qu'un jour j'écrive un long billet sur la différence entre Droit et Fait. L'absence de conceptualisation de la distinction catégorique nette entre Droit et Fait semble être une caractéristique commune à de nombreux esprits intelligents qui rejettent le libéralisme. Le Fait est de l'ordre du Métaphysique, de ce qui est donné, de cette Réalité "qui reste quand on cesse d'y croire". Le Droit est de l'ordre de l'Éthique, de ce qui doit être, de cette Action Humaine qui est le fait de l'homme parce qu'il y croit. (Notons qu'à défaut de lui connaître un meilleur nom, j'appelle ici Éthique ce continuum qui contient entre autres la morale individuelle autant que l'espace juridique du Droit, qui se distinguent en ce que le premier fonde ses évaluations sur les opinions individuelles, tandis que le suivant fonde les siennes sur les connaissances communes, sans parler de tous les variantes imaginables.)

Là où la confusion catégorique entre Fait et Droit devient la plus grotesque est quand un bienpensant de quelque bord en vient à rejeter avec véhémence un point de vue sous prétexte qu'il mène à des conclusions odieuses. Exemple récent, un communiste rejetait le point de vue Darwiniste, sous prétexte qu'il promouvrait l'exploitation du faible par le fort. Dans cette démarche comme partout dans le reste de notre échange épistolaire, il était incapable de distinguer métaphysique et juridique, incapable de faire la différence entre discours normatif et discours descriptif. Or, interpréter normativement en "cela DOIT être" ce qui se veut le descriptif "cela EST" relève de l'erreur de catégorie; et cette erreur est invisible à qui est innocent de la distinction entre Fait et Droit. D'où la psychopathologie qui consiste à redouter et vouloir censurer un point de vue descriptif sous prétexte qu'avec ladite erreur de catégorie on obtiendrait une conclusion gênante. Encore une phobie basée sur une croyance irrationnelle de l'ordre de l'erreur catégorique -- où Albert Ellis et Alfred Korzybski se complètent. (Pour un esprit rationnel, tous les points de vue rationnels sur la réalité sont valables, et de par l'existence de la réalité, ils se recoupent forcément de façon cohérente moyennant réinterprétation adéquate, toute contradiction étant dans l'observation ou l'interprétation et non pas dans la structure objective sous-jacente. Pour resortir un vocabulaire de matheux, ces points de vue sont des homéomorphismes locaux dressant des cartes d'une variété et localement identiques à isomorphisme près sur les domaines où ils se recouvrent.)

I am relieved to announce the release of Economic Reasoning vs Accounting Fallacies -- The Case of "Public" Research. This is the translation to English of my 2003 article Raisonnement économique contre sophismes comptables -- Le cas de la recherche « publique ». Many thanks to Bruno and Johan for their help in translating. Please feel free to comment on the expression as well as on the ideas.

Ideas matter. There are correct ideas, and wrong ideas. This is the agreement implicit in any sincere debate. Without this agreement, the content of any debate is irrelevant. (Of course, there are also social interactions where content doesn't matter -- but they are not debates, precisely.) Of course, the debate itself is only considered useful if there is a mismatch of knowledge between participants. If they think the same, they have nothing to learn but the fact that they think the same. And if they think differently, it means that at least one has something to teach to the other, that the other doesn't know, or currently disagrees with.

Dear Roderick,

in your blog entry Are We All Consequentialists Now?, you argue against consequentialism. What a joke! Your opposition between consequences and principles is a false dichotomy. The objective world is one and does not depend on the point of view taken. When you consider things up to isomorphism, you realize that consequentialism is but the requirement that theories be logically coherent. Denying consequentialism is denying that logic applies in philosophical matters. Deontics and utilism (to reuse the term by Hazlitt instead of the over-ended "utilitarianism" -- but then why not usism?) are but different points of view, and can but coincide in their conclusions. As Bastiat would put it, there are Harmonies in Nature. These harmonies are but the correspondances between various points of view due to the fact that they all valid points of view but describe the very same underlying structure from various different angles. Any possible contradiction is but a mistake in whoever reaches an absurd conclusion, and not an indictment of the coherence of the universe. There is no contradiction in the universe. Let's leave philosophical dilemmas to absurdists.

Roderick replied: